RMB Internationalization and Its Implications for Asian Monetary Cooperation by Wang, Yunjong
The status of the renminbi (RMB), China’s currency, is not 
commensurate with the country’s global economic prowess as the 
world’s largest trading nation and second largest economic power 
measured by GDP. When the global financial crisis revealed the 
inherent defects of the existing U.S. dollar-centric international 
monetary system, the government of People’s Republic of China 
initiated efforts to promote the international use of the RMB. This 
paper reviews the historical experience of international currencies 
and examines the implications for RMB. It addresses some of the 
imperfections of the current international monetary system as well 
as the background and motivation of RMB internationalization. 
By evaluating the main developments since 2009, the paper deals 
with the remaining issues related to RMB internationalization, 
such as capital account liberalization, exchange rate regime, and 
domestic financial market reform. Findings indicate that the RMB 
will unlikely replace the role of the dollar, because the euro could 
not challenge the status of the dollar during the last decade. Despite 
without a formal monetary arrangement such as the euro, the RMB 
may achieve its status as a regional settlement currency within 
Asia, given the increasing volume of trade with China.
Yunjong Wang, Visiting Fellow, Korea Institute of Finance, and adjunct 
professor, Catholic University of Korea, Seoul YWCA Building 7th Floor, 20 
Myong-Dong 11 Gil, Jung-Gu, Seoul, Korea 04538. (E-mail): yjwang00@hotmail.
com, (Tel): +82-10-6269-0271.
The earlier version was presented at the Seventh Asia-Pacific Forum on 
Economics and Finance, organized by Central University of Finance and 
Economics, Beijing, People’s Republic of China. The author is grateful to Barry 
Eichengreen, Masahiro Kawai, Liqing Zhang, and anonymous referees for their 
valuable comments. 
[Seoul Journal of Economics 2017, Vol. 30, No. 1]
RMB Internationalization and Its 
Implications for Asian Monetary 
Cooperation
Yunjong Wang
20 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Keywords:  RMB Internationalization, Monetary cooperation, 
International currency
JEL Classification: F31, F33
I. Introduction
Many international experts and authorities widely shared the view of 
America’s inevitable decline when the global financial crisis, the worst 
economic crisis since the Great Depression, arose in 2008. While the 
U.S. has been severely buffeted by financial meltdown and economic 
setbacks, China has shown remarkable resilience with its steady 
growth trajectory. The real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of 
China recorded in 2010 was in double digits—10.4%.1 China surpassed 
all other advanced industrial nations except for the U.S. in overall 
economic size, and is now rapidly closing the gap with the U.S.  
The status of the renminbi (RMB), China’s currency, is not 
commensurate with the country’s global economic prowess. When 
the global financial crisis revealed the inherent defects of the existing 
U.S. dollar-centric international monetary system, the government 
of People’s Republic of China (PRC) initiated efforts to promote the 
international use of the RMB. Since then, China has taken a gradual 
approach in seeking the global status of the RMB. 
RMB internationalization is particularly interesting because China 
is the first emerging market economy attempting to internationalize 
its currency, without full capital account convertibility, free floating 
exchange rate, and credible domestic financial market. People’s Bank 
of China (PBOC) appears well aware of the difficulties inherent in the 
experiment of RMB internationalization. To achieve the goal of fully 
advanced financial market through RMB internationalization, China 
must surmount many daunting obstacles. Beijing will have to deal 
with the unintended consequences of policy actions in the course of 
1 On January 22, 2010, the Chinese State Statistical Bureau announced that 
the real GDP growth rate of China remained at 8.7% in 2009, fulfilling the 8% 
target preset by the central government at the end of 2008. This remarkable 
achievement was mainly attributed to expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. 
See Xu (2010) for more details.
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RMB internationalization. Presently, no one can surely predict whether 
China’s experiment is doomed to fail.
A large volume of literature on RMB internationalization exists. Some 
papers deal with the feasibility of RMB internationalization in light 
of necessary conditions for currency internationalization originally 
introduced by Cohen (1971) and Kenen (1983). Other papers focus 
on the sequencing issue—on RMB internationalization—by drawing 
an inference from the literature regarding the order of economic 
liberalization in the transition from a planned economy to a market 
system. Several papers also review the benefits and costs of RMB 
internationalization in both domestic and global contexts. Some 
empirical analyses have recently provided insights into the currency 
composition of the RMB in using settlement, investment, and foreign 
exchange reserves. Nonetheless, research on the issue of monetary 
cooperation in the regional context is limited.2 This paper intends to 
examine the various issues related to the emergence of the RMB as an 
international currency and future course of monetary cooperation in 
Asia.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly 
reviews the historical experience of international currencies and draws 
implications for the RMB. Section III addresses some of the imperfections 
in the current international monetary system and the background and 
motivation of the recent emergence of RMB internationalization. Section 
IV discusses the main developments in RMB internationalization 
since 2009. Section V deals with the remaining issues related to RMB 
internationalization, such as capital account liberalization, exchange 
rate regime, and domestic financial market reform. Section VI highlights 
the implications of RMB internationalization for future Asian monetary 
cooperation. Finally, section VII concludes with the future prospects of 
RMB internationalization.
2 Ito (2016) mentioned that the diversity of monetary and financial 
arrangements in Asia makes pursuing policy coordination difficult for Asian 
countries. However, he indicated that an increasing number of Asian countries 
will use RMB as denomination and manage their currencies so that their 
currencies will co-move with the RMB.
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II. Historical Experiences of International Currencies
When ruminating on the future prospects of RMB internationalization, 
reviewing the historical experiences is helpful. This section briefly 
overviews the historical records of international currencies and draws 
the lessons and implications for the RMB. 
After 1821, the monetary unit of Britain—pound sterling—was 
defined in terms of gold. The sterling price of gold was fixed. The gold 
standard allowed the paper currency to be freely converted into its 
gold equivalent at face value. The issue of Bank of England notes was 
strictly regulated by law after 1884; extra issues must be backed fully 
by gold. As Britain was not a gold producer, increases in the gold coin 
and banknote component of the stock of money depended on the net 
import of gold.
British monetary policy was dominated by the needs of the gold 
standard until the occurrence of the First World War in 1914. The 
main policy objective of the Bank of England was the maintenance of 
specie payments or the convertibility of its notes for gold at face value 
on demand, ensuring the fixity of the link between the pound sterling 
and gold. The pound was not only a national currency but also widely 
used internationally as a trade settlement and reserve currency, and 
the world’s major financial and gold markets were in London. Both 
domestic and international users of the pound had high confidence 
in the currency. The bank’s task was to maintain this confidence 
by ensuring convertibility into gold. The bank was successful in the 
changing economic environment fifty years before 1914 (Ford 1981).
Historians estimate that roughly 60% of the world trade was 
invoiced in pound sterling in the late 19th century. In 1899, almost 
two thirds of known foreign exchange holdings of official institutions 
were in pound, and this figure was more than twice the total of the 
next competitors, the French franc and German mark. The U.S. dollar 
was not yet considered as an internationally used currency at that 
time. The ranking of the four currencies remained the same in 1913. 
By 1917, the U.S. dollar emerged as a major international currency. 
Foreign central banks began to hold dollar reserves, and the currency 
was increasingly used in trade and finance. Interestingly, the dollar’s 
main problem prior to 1914 was not the size of the economy: the U.S. 
economy had surpassed the U.K. economy in 1872. Rather, the country 
lacked deep, liquid, and open financial markets. The U.S. also did not 
23RMB InteRnatIonalIzatIon
own a central bank, which was considered a prerequisite for developing 
financial market instruments, such as bankers’ acceptance. The dollar 
also fell short in terms of foreign confidence in its value because the U.S. 
frequently experienced banking crises and lacked a lender of last resort 
(Frankel 2012).
In an effort to provide the financial system with an institution that 
could serve as a lender of last resort in times of crisis and help improve 
financial stability, the Federal Reserve Act was passed in 1913, creating 
the Federal Reserve System (Fed).3 Upon the establishment of the 
central bank, the U.S. rapidly progressed in providing trade credit. 
Eichengreen (2011) argues that the establishment of a market in dollar-
denominated trade acceptances among banks dramatically promoted 
the internationalization of the U.S. dollar. The Fed could establish the 
credibility of the dollar as a source of reliable trade credit by becoming a 
leading market-maker in the secondary market for dollar-denominated 
trade acceptances. The international role of the dollar developed along 
with the financial markets. The onset of the First World War accelerated 
the improvement of the status of dollar: large-scale wartime lending by 
the U.S to the U.K. and other nations involved reversed the 19th century 
creditor–debtor relationship and positioned the dollar as a strong and 
credible currency (Frankel 2012).
Notwithstanding the Fed’s active role in the trade acceptance market 
(Eichengreen 2011) ultimately, the rise of the dollar to global status 
was predominantly market driven (Maziad, and Kang 2012). Frankel 
(2012) also emphasizes that the rapid ascent of the dollar occurred 
without any desire, whether on the part of the public or politicians, for 
international prestige or power on the world stage, and the Fed did not 
actively promote a special global role for the currency. 
Eichengreen (2011) claims that by the second half of the 1920s, 
more than half of U.S. imports and exports were financed by bank 
acceptances denominated in dollars. The attractiveness of doing 
business in New York reflected the fact that the interest rate that 
importers and exporters must pay then was nearly a full percentage 
lower than that in London. He wrote, “From a standing start in 1914, 
3 The Fed was purposefully structured to remain weak by decentralizing its 
power among 12 loosely connected regional central banks, reflecting the nation’s 
suspicion toward large banking. This lack of leadership was a major reason for 
the inept behavior of Fed during the Great Depression.
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the dollar had already overtaken pound by 1925. This should be taken 
as a caution by those inclined to argue that incumbency gives the dollar 
formidable advantages today (Eichengreen, 2011, p. 32).”
With regard to RMB internationalization, this historical experience 
vividly demonstrates that the current dollar dominance cannot persist 
endlessly. Eichengreen (2011) argues “it is not impossible to imagine 
something analogous today. For the wartime shock to sterling, 
substitute chronic U.S. budget deficits. And for the efforts of the Fed 
to establish a market in trade acceptances in New York, substitute the 
efforts of Chinese officials to establish Shanghai as an international 
financial center. The renminbi replacing the dollar may not be anyone’s 
baseline scenario, but it is worth recalling the history of the 1920s 
before dismissing the possibility.”
Another critical time in the ascent of the U.S. dollar to global currency 
status was the development of a thriving offshore U.S. dollar market, 
Eurodollars. Eurodollars are time deposits denominated in the U.S. 
dollar at banks outside the U.S. and thus are not under the jurisdiction 
of the Fed. Consequently, such deposits are subject to much less 
regulation than similar deposits within the U.S. Without these offshore 
markets, the dollar would not have attained its dominant role (He, and 
McCauley 2010). Nevertheless, the U.S. government did not intend to 
create the offshore dollar market. On the contrary, offshore market was 
accidentally created from entirely pure market reactions.
After the Second World War, a large amount of the U.S. dollar 
was supplied to Europe as a result of both the Marshall Plan and 
imports into the U.S., which had become the largest consumer market. 
Consequently, enormous sums of the U.S. dollar were in the custody 
of foreign banks outside the U.S. Some foreign countries, including the 
Soviet Union, also had deposits in the U.S. dollar in American banks, 
granted by certificates. The Soviet Union started to transfer their 
deposits into a safe place, such as a British bank in fear of confiscation 
during the Cold War period. British banks subsequently deposited 
that money in U.S. banks. In the mid-1950s, Eurodollar trading and 
its development into a dominant world currency began when the 
Soviet Union requested improved interest rates on their Eurodollars. 
Offshore banks were free of reserve requirements and deposit insurance 
assessments, and thus they could pay a slightly higher interest rate on 
Eurodollars than onshore banks. 
He, and McCauley (2010) also point out that the development of 
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the Eurodollar market was a reaction to capital controls in the U.S., 
particularly the interest equalization tax of 1963 and later restraints 
on capital exports. U.S. authorities also placed restrictive capital 
controls from the late 1960s until early 1970s when the U.S. found 
the maintenance of overvalued exchange rates increasingly difficult. 
However, the authorities never restricted the flow of payments through 
U.S. banks to allow the settlement of offshore trade and investment 
transactions, enabling the offshore market to flourish despite capital 
controls onshore. 
Under the Bretton Woods system, the U.S. maintained the dollar on 
the de facto gold standard, and other countries fixed their exchange 
rates to the dollar. Although the stated purpose of Bretton Woods was 
to encourage capital and trade flows, the system actually allowed many 
avenues for governments to manipulate exchange rates and regulate 
capital flows. To secure fixed exchange rate and independent monetary 
policy, free capital mobility cannot be achieved simultaneously.4 During 
the mid-1960s, however, international capital flows began to gradually 
expand. Expanding capital flows eventually led to the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system. President Nixon took the dollar entirely off gold 
in 1971, and the fixed exchange rate system completely ended in 1973 
(Frankel 2012).
After the disintegration of the Bretton Woods system (1971-73), many 
assumed that countries would need reduced reserves. Considering the 
flexibility of exchange rates, a shock to the balance of payments could 
be absorbed by allowing currencies to adjust. Central banks no longer 
have to hold other currencies to intervene in the foreign exchange 
markets. Eichengreen (2011) notes two surprises. The first one was 
the absence of decline in the demand for reserves. When shifting to 
flexible exchange rates, countries held the same or even more reserves. 
Countries intervened when they concluded that the exchange rate had 
4 International macroeconomics has often postulated the trilemma: with 
free capital mobility, independent monetary policies are feasible if and only if 
exchange rates are floating. However, Helen Rey (2013) has recently dismissed 
the traditional view of open economy. She wrote “fluctuating exchange rates 
cannot insulate economies from the global financial cycle, when capital is 
mobile.” The trilemma morphs into a dilemma: independent monetary policies 
are possible if and only if the capital account is managed, directly or indirectly, 
regardless of the exchange rate regime.
26 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
deviated too far from its fundamental value. Their intervention resulted 
in the accumulation of reserves. The second surprise was that no shift 
away from the dollar occurred. The dollar share of total foreign reserves 
remained close to 80% in 1977, as the U.S. pumped out dollars and the 
members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
who priced oil in the U.S. dollar, parked their earnings in New York.
U.S. dollar inflation and depreciation started to impair the 
international attractiveness of the dollar as a store of value after 1977. 
The U.S. was perceived to be neglecting its responsibility to provide the 
“public goods” of a stable anchor for the international monetary system 
(Frankel 2012). Predictably, the dollar resumed its decline. Complaints 
mounted about U.S. policy and the losses experienced by foreign 
holders of dollars. OPEC rediscussed the possibility of pricing oil in 
another currency. The dollar share in foreign exchange reserves sharply 
declined from around 80% in 1977 to below 60% in 1980. In 1977-1980, 
when talks about the dollar losing its exorbitant privilege abounded, the 
primary reason for its declining share of global reserves was that the 
value of other currencies inflated as the dollar depreciated and not that 
central banks sold what they held. The dollar share stabilized after the 
Volcker took over the Fed, and the currency subsequently strengthened 
(Eichengreen 2011).
In the 1980s, central banks around the world gradually began to 
hold Deutsche mark and Japanese yen as foreign exchange reserves 
although both Germany and Japan were not enthusiastic toward 
the internationalization of their currencies. German policy was 
actually opposed to internationalization. In terms of foreign policy, a 
strong aversion to the behavior of showing off in the world stage was 
observed. Domestically, the powerful manufacturing sector feared that 
internationalization would lead to appreciation of Deutsche mark, thus 
hurting export competitiveness.5 Despite this official resistance, the 
mark continued to gain international status throughout the 1980s as a 
result of the growing size of the German economy (especially trade) and 
5 Frankel (2012) points to the distinction between the financial sector, which 
supports a strong currency, and the manufacturing sector that does not. He 
suggests that the financial sector can be more influential in countries where it 
is large and powerful: the U.K. and Switzerland. However, the financial sector 
was excessively small, relative to the manufacturing sector, to carry significant 
weight in Germany and Japan.
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the impeccable reputation that the Bundesbank had established for 
keeping the strong value of mark. The trend was reversed in the 1990s 
for numerous contributing factors, including the slow economic growth 
after German reunification in 1991 and regained strength and credibility 
of the U.S. economy as reflected in sustained noninflationary economic 
expansion, steady elimination of budget deficits, and appreciation of the 
dollar in the second half of the 1990s (Maziad, and Kang 2012).
The Japanese yen was also a new player in the currency competition. 
Although the yen share in the global reserves had risen in the 1970s, 
other measures of internationalization, such as the use of the currency 
in invoicing trade or denominating debt, continued to show a low share. 
Similar to Germany, the prevailing perception was that increased 
demand for the yen would hurt export competitiveness. During the 
first half of 1980s, the Japanese government continued to oppose 
internationalization. By the mid-1980s, the policy shifted toward 
actively promoting internationalization in the context of the Yen/Dollar 
Agreement and later with the Plaza Accord aimed at depreciating the 
dollar and resolving serious global imbalances. The international use 
of the yen rose gradually in the 1980s and its share of foreign reserves 
reached almost 9% in 1991, which was the peak (Talvas, and Ozeki 
1992).
In the 1990s, official policy shifted firmly in favor of internationalization, 
with the aims of reducing exchange rate risk for domestic firms, 
facilitating business for Japanese banks and other financial institutions, 
and promoting Japan as a financial center. A comprehensive package 
of financial liberalization of 1996 and the resulting “big bang” of 1998, 
however, were not successful in advancing the yen internationalization. 
Such failure was largely due to the stagnation of the Japanese economy 
since the bursting of the equity and real estate bubbles at the start of 
the 1990s. Takagi (2011) wrote “by the end of 2003, it was clear that 
any further attempt to internationalize the yen would be futile without 
a fundamental change in the economic might of Japan.” 
The experiences of the U.S. dollar, mark, and yen highlight that 
currency internationalization is largely market driven. The rapid ascent 
of the dollar occurred without any deliberate desire for boosting its 
international standing. Similarly, the Deutsche mark and Japanese 
yen rose as alternative currencies to the dollar, when the U.S. economy 
faced severe economic downturns. As the U.S. regained its economic 
strength and financial credibility, the trend was immediately reversed. 
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On the contrary, when Germany and Japan were mired in economic 
difficulties since the early 1990s, their potentially promising currencies 
could no longer advance their global status vis-à-vis the dollar. In short, 
the process of currency internationalization is broadly determined 
by the country’s economic strength, credibility of the currency, and 
financial sector development and stability. This implies that the 
fundamental drivers for RMB internationalization will be largely market-
determined rather than determined by political aspiration alone.
III.  Defective International Monetary System and 
Emergence of RMB Internationalization
Throughout history, relations between dominant states and rising 
ones have been unstable. Established powers tend to regard themselves 
as defenders of an international order they help create and from 
which they continue to benefit; rising powers feel constrained, even 
cheated by the status quo and struggle against it to take what they 
think is rightfully theirs. These patterns are clearly visible today in the 
behaviors of the U.S. and China (Friedberg 2011). 
The global financial crisis revealed the inherent deficiencies of the 
existing international monetary system. As evident in previous crises, 
numerous proposals for reforming the international monetary and 
financial architecture were put forward. On March 23, 2009, PBOC 
Governor Zhou Xiaochuan, in particular, published a three-page long 
essay, wherein he asked “what kind of international reserve currency 
do we need to secure global financial stability and facilitate world 
economic growth, which was one of the purposes for establishing the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)” (Zhou 2009). He pointed out that 
the desirable goal of reforming the international monetary system was 
to “create an international reserve currency that is disconnected from 
individual nations and is able to remain stable in the long run.” He 
emphatically made a proposal for creating a super-sovereign reserve 
currency on the basis of special drawing rights (SDR).6 He suggested 
that the IMF and countries concerned should “actively promote the use 
6 As Zhou noted in his essay, the role of the SDR has not been fully acted 
because of the limitations on its allocation and the scope of its uses. The SDR 
has become largely irrelevant except in its minor role as an accounting unit. 
Moreover, no liquid private market in SDR assets exists.
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of the SDR in international trade, commodities pricing, investment and 
corporate book-keeping” and “creating financial assets denominated in 
the SDR to increase its appeal.” His proposal is an attempt to deprive 
the U.S. dollar of its “exorbitant privilege,” which was then shared by 
many countries in the world (Yu 2014).  
Zhou’s proposal was treated respectfully as a contribution to the 
global monetary governance debate. However, the reform of the 
international monetary system has been historically difficult without 
the strong support of the U.S. government. Few industrialized countries 
were serious about replacing the U.S. dollar with the SDR (Yu 2014). As 
Yu introduced in his paper, the PRC leadership was unable to challenge 
the supremacy of the U.S. dollar. Thus, the proposal of Governor Zhou 
was simply dismissed as “personal” by a spokesman of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs right after U.S. President Barack Obama dismissed 
Governor Zhou’s proposal by saying that a world currency was 
unnecessary and the U.S. dollar was strong at that current time.
PBOC Governor Zhou’s ambitious proposal is closely linked to the 
need for an international lender of last resort (ILLR), which dates back 
to the inception of the Bretton Woods system, with the British proposal 
for an International Clearing Union (ICU). Back in the 1940s, John 
Maynard Keynes had already proposed to introduce an international 
currency unit named “Bancor” based on the value of 30 representative 
commodities. The ICU would provide automatic financing for current 
account deficits. Keynes’ proposal was turned down in favor of the 
U.S. proposal, which was based on the idea of a credit union “in which 
each member’s access to balance of payments finance was to be based 
on the quota it contributed to the common pool and on a reciprocal 
commitment to grant credit to other members” (Gianini, 1997, p. 17).
The issue of an ILLR may be simplified into two questions. The first 
is whether an ILLR is necessary. If so, the second question is what 
institutions, or group of institutions, should assume this responsibility. 
Kindleberger (1973, 1989) claimed that the international dimension of 
crises makes a case for such global institution. When a crisis arises, 
countries may face limited access to private capital markets although 
they are not suffering from serious structural problems and are 
implementing appropriate policy corrections. As a domestic lender of 
last resort can act promptly to prevent a bank run of an illiquid but 
solvent financial company, an international equivalent can be expected 
to play a similar role not only in enabling an illiquid but solvent 
30 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
country to survive but also in arresting contagion to other countries. 
The rationale for intervention in the form of official public financial 
organizations at both national and international levels is related to the 
intrinsic instability of the global financial markets (Park, and Wang 
2002).
With regard to the second question, the debate on the reform of 
the international financial architecture has effectively ruled out the 
possibility of creating a global central bank. Eichengreen (2000), for 
instance, dismissed the idea of a global central bank as quixotic, 
leading to the question of whether and how the existing Bretton Woods 
institutions should be reconstructed to serve as a lender of last resort. 
As the global financial crisis demonstrates, the main pillars of the 
international financial architecture have not been seriously amended. 
The financial resources of IMF have been immediately expanded after 
the global financial crisis, but the main supply of the global liquidity 
was provided by the central banks of the major countries (the U.S., 
Europe, and Japan) on behalf of unconventional quantitative easing 
(QE).
Even before the global financial crisis emerged, Chinese elites had 
long been highly concerned about their excessive dependence on the 
U.S. dollar, particularly in the form of dollar-denominated assets. To 
reduce excessive dollar reliance, China should diversify its foreign 
reserves. Considering that the euro performed successfully from its 
creation to the outbreak of the global financial crisis, China attempted 
to increase the share of euro in the currency composition of its own 
foreign reserves. However, the European Central Bank (ECB) cannot 
legally issue its own bond (so-called euro bond). Only member countries 
can issue their government bond, but the market size of individual 
members has been relatively small. As China continues to accumulate 
foreign reserves at a rate of approximately 400 billion USD a year, no 
alternative market exists except for the U.S. Treasury bond market. 
Moreover, in foreign reserve management, central banks tend to put 
more weight on safety and liquidity rather than asset returns. Thus, 
asset classes only eligible for foreign reserve holdings are limited. China 
as the number one country of foreign reserve holdings has inevitably 
fallen into the dollar trap.
In this situation, China could not sacrifice its exchange rate stability 
by adopting a flexible exchange rate regime. At the same time, China 
could not fully open the capital account and relinquish independent 
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monetary policy. As the impossible trinity (i.e., trilemma) states, China 
could not acquire free capital mobility, independent monetary policy, 
and fixed exchange rate simultaneously. China has been pursuing 
an intermediate zone by having a limitedly independent monetary 
policy, strongly managed exchange rate, and partially open capital 
account.7 Above all, to maintain the stable exchange rate of the RMB, 
China should continue to accumulate its foreign reserves by increasing 
holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds. Summers (2004) correctly picked 
out China’s weakness and stated that “it is true and can be argued 
forcefully that the incentive for Japan and China to dump treasury 
bills at a rapid rate is not very strong, given the consequences that it 
would have for their own economies.” Summers called this a “balance of 
financial terror,” wherein China simply cannot stop financing the U.S. 
(He 2015). Even in the two years following the global financial crisis, 
China actually increased its holdings of U.S. Treasury securities. China 
must escape the dollar trap in the medium and long run. One way is 
the creation of international currency, such as SDR, as ambitiously 
proposed by Governor Zhou. As the proposal was bluntly rejected by 
the U.S. and the international financial community, China’s only option 
is to promote RMB internationalization, although this approach is yet 
to be adopted and no one can clearly predict how long the process will 
take. 
IV. RMB Internationalization: Progress and Limitations
Before 2009, only sporadic discussions on RMB internationalization 
existed. On March 9, 2008, then Senior Deputy Governor of PBOC, Wu 
Xiaoling, said that the conditions for RMB internationalization were 
immature and it was not on the agenda yet. Nevertheless, she thought 
that the issue of creating an offshore financial center in Hong Kong 
should be studied. In September 2008, Wu emphasized that to make 
the RMB an international currency, two conditions must be satisfied: 
the full convertibility of the RMB and the width and depth of the RMB 
financial market must be accomplished vis-à-vis those of the U.S. 
dollar financial market (Yu 2014). Such ambiguous attitude toward 
7 The PRC’s monetary autonomy (independence) has been reduced with falling 
capital control effectiveness and rigid exchange rate regime that remains tightly 
managed against the U.S. dollar (Kawai, and Liu 2015).
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RMB internationalization has changed after Governor Zhou’s proposal 
was turned down by the international community. In spite of the 
unfinished market-oriented reform on the exchange and interest rate 
and strictly controlled capital account, PBOC started to promote RMB 
internationalization in a low-profile manner through cross-border trade 
settlement, offshore RMB market establishment, and swap agreements 
with other central banks. 
As suggested by Wu Xiaoling, PBOC officials clearly understood 
the kind of sequencing that would be the most desirable and feasible 
for RMB internationalization. The general consensus states that the 
external financial liberalization should be the last step in the economic 
liberalization of a typical emerging market economy (McKinnon 1991). In 
most cases, the domestic financial market reform is a prerequisite of an 
external financial liberalization. However, the domestic financial reform 
is a never-ending task considering the powerful vested interest groups 
in the emerging market economies, in which China is no exception. 
In China, groups such as large state-owned commercial banks, state-
owned industrial enterprises, export industries, local government, 
real estate and construction industries, and anti-liberalization policy 
makers not only benefit from the financial repression and pro-growth 
state-led economic development model but also tend to oppose any 
serious policy changes, including the exchange and domestic interest 
rate liberalization. Thus, the current route of RMB internationalization 
under the dual control of the capital account and exchange rate 
highlights the dominance of PBOC in governing the process (He 2015).
PBOC has never clearly announced the official timetable for 
RMB internationalization. The bank’s approach toward RMB 
internationalization is cautious so as not to infuriate the powerful 
anti-liberalization groups. All the measures taken for RMB 
internationalization thus far have been gradual and manageable. RMB 
internationalization is promoted in an unconventional manner, with 
the perception that China is not yet fully prepared for liberalizing its 
capital account as well as has not finished its market-based exchange 
rate regime and finalized its market-oriented domestic interest rate 
(particularly deposit rate). Therefore, RMB internationalization is an 
unfinished agenda and essentially tantamount to an ultimate goal 
for China’s global financial supremacy. As clearly pointed out by 
He (2015) and Volz (2013), China’s current approach toward RMB 
internationalization has been triggered mostly by the aspiration of 
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PBOC for domestic financial reform, along with the country’s defensive 
reaction to reduce its excessive dependence on the U.S. dollar.
Since 2009, PBOC has adopted a functional approach to promote 
the role of the RMB as a settlement, investment, and finally reserve 
currency. As Yu (2014) noted, this approach is exactly the same with 
that proposed by Zhou (2009) regarding the use of the SDR as a 
supranational currency in place of the U.S. dollar.
A. Trade Settlement in RMB 
In April 2009, PBOC announced a pilot scheme of trade settlement 
in RMB, which was initially limited to five pilot cities but immediately 
broadened to include 20 provinces and cities in the mainland in 2010. 
Given that China was running a current account surplus, the strategy 
was to use the RMB as an import settlement currency. To encourage 
non-residents (including foreign exporters) to accept RMB payments, 
RMB recycling channels should be established for non-residents to 
invest their RMB proceeds in RMB-denominated assets. In particular, 
residents in Hong Kong were encouraged to hold RMB deposits, 
corporate bonds, and government bonds. The progress in using the 
RMB as a settlement currency was impressive. Since the third quarter 
of 2010, the amount of RMB trade settlement increased dramatically. 
In the first quarter of 2013, the quarterly trade settlement in RMB 
surpassed 1 trillion CNY or around 11% of the PRC’s total trade.8 RMB 
cross-border trade settlement in 2014 reached 6.55 trillion CNY. A total 
of 25.4% of the PRC’s trade was settled in RMB, compared with almost 
zero in 2009. However, the RMB was used only for Chinese exports and 
imports and not for third party trade settlement. Such trade settlement 
was mostly made between Mainland China and Hong Kong.9 As a 
result, RMB deposits in Hong Kong also rose dramatically during the 
past three years. Hong Kong remains the single largest repository of 
offshore RMB deposits. The amount of RMB deposits in Hong Kong 
reached 1 trillion CNY in December 2014. These outcomes demonstrate 
the importance of Hong Kong in the course of RMB internationalization 
8 CNY is the official ISO code for the renminbi. Market practitioners, for their 
convenience, labeled the renminbi traded in the offshore markets the CNH rather 
than the CNY.
9 Approximately 80 percent of trade settlement in RMB is through Hong Kong. 
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(Zhang, and Tao 2014). 
The RMB has been used as a settlement currency for exports and 
imports between China and Korea. In 2011, the proportion of RMB 
settlement was 0.8% for Korean exports to China and 0.1% for Korean 
imports from China. In the third quarter of 2015, the proportion 
increased to 3.4% for exports and 3.3% for imports. Since 2014, when 
offshore RMB clearing bank was established in Seoul, the RMB has 
been widely used in bilateral trade settlements. Nevertheless, the 
proportion of RMB settlement in Korea’s overall trade remains negligible 
at less than 0.1%. Even between Korea and China, almost 93-95% of 
trade is settled in the U.S. dollar. In the trade between EU and Korea, 
the proportion of euro settlement is almost 50% for Korean exports 
and 40-43% for imports. Similarly, in the trade between Japan and 
Korea, the proportion of yen settlement is almost 50% for Korean 
exports and 45-47% for Korean imports. The relatively low presence of 
RMB settlement is mainly due to the relatively expensive transaction 
costs, legacy, inconvenience, and limited financial products for RMB 
holdings.10
According to the data provided by the Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), the international use of the RMB 
has surged in the past few years. The ranking of the RMB in the league 
of world payment currency by value rose from the 17th most commonly 
used currency by the end of 2011 to the top five currency in November 
2014 (SWIFT 2012, 2016). The RMB now ranks after the Japanese yen, 
British pound, euro, and U.S. dollar.
B. Cross-Border Direct Investment in RMB
Since January 2011, PRC enterprises have been allowed to invest 
offshore in RMB for greenfield investment, mergers and acquisitions, 
equity participation, and other means of acquiring direct ownership or 
actual control. Enterprises can raise RMB funds onshore and remit the 
10 Rhee, and Sumulong (2014) pointed out that transaction costs of using 
non-U.S. dollar currencies were high because adequate settlement infrastructure 
has not been built. They proposed an interim solution by establishing proper 
regional settlement infrastructure for regional currencies to significantly 
reduce the transaction costs. To do so, a combined system for both trade and 
government bonds settlement in RMB can be considered for simultaneously 
promoting RMB internationalization and RMB-denominated bond market.
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funds offshore via onshore banks. The offshore branches of onshore 
banks can raise RMB funds onshore and extend loans to enterprises for 
offshore investment. Similarly, as of October 2011, foreign enterprises 
have been allowed to invest onshore in RMB. However, in July 2012, 
the PBOC restricted RMB foreign direct investment in securities, 
derivatives, and properties. The scale of RMB settlement for foreign 
direct investment was much greater than for overseas direct investment. 
In 2014, the total amount of the cross-border direct investment reached 
1,049 billion CNY; approximately 862 billion CNY of which was foreign 
direct investment, and roughly 187 billion CNY was overseas direct 
investment (International Monetary Institute 2015). 
C. RMB Offshore Market
Building the RMB offshore market is essential for overcoming the 
inherent limited convertibility of the RMB and expanding its use outside 
Mainland China. In this market, non-residents can access the RMB for 
trade and investment and are encouraged to buy RMB-denominated 
assets while China’s monetary authorities retain control over the 
speed of capital account liberalization. Unlike the Eurodollar market 
that grew rapidly outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. in the 1950s and 
1960s, the RMB offshore market is currently being driven by RMB 
internationalization initiative and various policies. 
Mainly through RMB import settlement, RMB offshore market has 
been growing rapidly in Hong Kong.11 Other RMB offshore markets in 
London, Singapore, and Taipei were also eager to expand offshore RMB 
businesses. From the middle of 2010 to the third quarter of 2011, RMB 
deposits held by Hong Kong residents skyrocketed. The total amount 
of RMB deposits was expected to surpass 1 trillion CNY by the end 
of 2012. However, the actual amount stood at 720 billion CNY by the 
end of 2012. The decline could be attributed to the weakening of RMB 
appreciation expectation, which in turn was caused by the weakening 
of the PRC’s balance of payments. 
In 2005, the PRC permitted domestic financial institutions to issue 
RMB-denominated bonds (so-called “dim sum” bonds) in Hong Kong. 
11 Hong Kong, which has benefited from its unique relation with the PRC, 
has enjoyed the first mover advantage in developing offshore RMB businesses 
(Cheung, and Yiu 2016).
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In August 2011, the PRC’s Ministry of Finance issued 20 billion CNY 
of government bonds in Hong Kong. This particular issuance was a 
major boost to RMB internationalization and an incentive to the people 
in Hong Kong (Yu 2014). Following this event, a number of PRC and 
foreign financial institutions and multinational enterprises have joined 
the issuance of RMB-denominated bonds. Moreover, according to a May 
2012 provision announced by the National Development and Reform 
Commission, the nonfinancial institutions were also allowed to issue 
RMB-denominated bonds in Hong Kong, China.12 The outstanding RMB-
denominated bonds amounted to 367 billion CNY by end of October 
2015 (HKMA 2016). Hong Kong owns the largest offshore liquidity, 
handling 70% of all RMB payments globally (HKMA 2016). Although 
Hong Kong remains the most important offshore RMB hub, it is now 
facing competition from Europe and other emerging RMB centers.13 
China is strategically building a network of offshore RMB centers across 
different geographic locations and time zone. In 2015, China assigned 
an offshore RMB clearing bank (one of the PRC’s four large state-owned 
banks) in the 20 offshore RMB centers, listed in Appendix Table1. 
In addition, the most important development in RMB offshore market 
is the introduction of RMB qualified foreign institutional investors 
(RQFII). The China Banking Regulatory Committee, PBOC, and State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange jointly initiated the RQFII scheme 
on December 16, 2011. According to this scheme, qualified foreign 
institutional investors were allowed to invest in the PRC’s A-share 
market in RMB. At the beginning, the RQFII quota was 20 billion CNY. 
In April and November 2012, the quota was raised to 50 billion CNY 
and 200 billion CNY, respectively.
12 Two Korean state banks—Korea Development Bank and Export Import Bank 
of Korea—issued dim sum bonds three times. In terms of market weight, these 
two banks are currently included in the top 10 issuers. On September 28, 2016, 
Shanghai-based China Eastern Airline has first issued Arirang bonds, which 
are Korean won-denominated bonds issued by a foreign entity, among Chinese 
firms. The first-ever Arirang bonds were initiated by the Asian Development 
Bank in September 1995 when it issued bonds worth 8 billion won. However, the 
market for Arirang bonds is extremely small.  
13 China’s endorsement is critical for overseas financial centers to set up the 
infrastructure and acquire the RMB liquidity for their offshore RMB businesses, 
because the RMB is not fully convertible and is subject to capital controls.
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D. Currency Swaps with Foreign Central Banks
Initially, the swap arrangements of PBOC with other central banks 
were mainly aimed at providing liquidity support to its counterparts, as 
the U.S. conducted currency swaps with several countries (e.g., South 
Korea, Brazil, Mexico, and Singapore) mainly to provide dollar liquidity 
for those countries in times of crisis. From 2008-2009, following the 
global financial crisis, the PRC signed eight currency swap agreements. 
However, in line with RMB internationalization, the swap arrangements 
were mainly aimed at encouraging the foreign central banks to hold 
RMB as foreign exchange reserves. Currently, China has maintained 
currency swap agreements with 32 countries, including Indonesia, 
Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong, Thailand, and Malaysia in East 
Asia. In particular, the bilateral currency swap with South Korea was 
first signed in December 2008 right after the global financial crisis, and 
was renewed and expanded in amount several times.
E. RMB as SDR basket currency
On November 30, 2015, the Executive Board of IMF decided that 
effective October 1, 2016, the RMB is included in the SDR basket as 
a fifth currency, along with the U.S. dollar, euro, Japanese yen, and 
pound sterling. Specifically, the IMF decided that the RMB meets the 
existing criteria for SDR basket inclusion. The IMF Board determined, 
with sufficient basis, that the RMB is a freely usable currency, given 
that China meets the export criterion. This decision is certainly a 
significant milestone of RMB internationalization. The steady increase 
in RMB internationalization will depend on China’s strong commitments 
to continue economic and financial reforms while representing its 
expanding role in global trade and direct investment. 
In the Fund’s lending transactions, when members borrow from the 
Fund, they may receive the RMB in their transactions, and when they 
make payments to the Fund, they are asked to pay in RMB. Mainly the 
SDR users, including the IMF itself, have been preparing for the change, 
which includes opening onshore RMB accounts and establishing 
banking relationships and procedures required to transact the RMB as 
well as Fund-related and reserve management transactions. However, 
the inclusion itself will not dramatically increase the demand for RMB 
as reserve currency. If China would like the RMB to join the club of 
reserve currencies, the country must allow its currency to obtain the 
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status of the “safe haven” currencies. The decision of central banks to 
hold their reserves in particular currencies depends on the structure 
of the country’s balance sheet of external assets and liabilities to avoid 
currency mismatch. In addition, holdings of foreign reserves must be 
easily cashable in times of currency and debt crisis. According to the 
criteria of liquidity, breadth, and openness, Chinese financial markets 
remain behind the major reserve currencies, such as the U.S. dollar and 
euro. 
Fortunately, the RMB will be identified in the IMF’s currency 
composition of foreign exchange reserves on the fourth quarter of 
2016. The separate identification of the RMB implies that IMF member 
countries can record, as official reserves, their holdings of RMB-
denominated external assets that are readily available for meeting 
balance of payment financing needs. The RMB will join the group of 
currencies that are currently identified in the survey, namely, the U.S. 
dollar, euro, yen, pound sterling, Swiss franc, Australian dollar, and 
Canadian dollar.
V. Unfinished Agendas toward Full RMB Internationalization
In Plaza Accord in 1985, the motive of the U.S. to promote the 
internationalization of the Japanese yen was based on a hypothesis 
that it would lead to yen appreciation and help the U.S. exports. The 
international use of the yen gradually continued to rise in the 1980s 
along with the Japanese monetary authority’s liberalization of capital 
account. However, the Japanese monetary authority frequently 
intervened to prevent the yen from appreciating. Understandably, a 
tension between the goal of internationalization and the goal of keeping 
the currency competitively valued existed. However, only strong 
currency could attain full internationalization status. Markets only 
accept strong currencies whose value can be maintained. In this regard, 
overcoming the “fear of floating” in China’s monetary authority and 
policy circles remains questionable. China’s preparedness to shift from 
the export-oriented growth strategy to the domestic demand-led growth 
strategy continues to be uncertain. Under the “new normal” paradigm, 
China has accelerated its structural adjustments and institutional 
reforms. These new developments are certainly beneficial to China and 
other neighboring countries. China must no longer be anxious about 
RMB appreciation. 
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As China moves forward to RMB internationalization, PBOC will 
adopt a much flexible exchange rate regime. The current managed 
floating exchange rate regime will not be immediately abolished.14 
Instead, PBOC aims to give great scope to the market in determining 
the RMB exchange rates. At the same time, PBOC enjoys the incentive 
to economize a substantial amount of foreign exchange reserves on its 
own. Two scenarios can be assumed, namely, to keep holding significant 
amount of reserves like Japan and minimize the holdings of reserves 
like the U.S. or the members of ECB. China must observe the situation 
during the transition period. Abrupt adjustment of foreign exchange 
reserves will affect asset prices, particularly the U.S. Treasury bills, 
which will result to smooth adjustments. Nonetheless, many emerging 
market countries also move together to hold much RMB-denominated 
assets in their foreign exchange reserves as RMB internationalization 
progresses.   
Formidable challenges in RMB internationalization remain on both 
the domestic and international fronts. A short list includes 1) the 
deregulation of domestic market interest rates, 2) full development 
of benchmark financial products, such as government bonds with 
various standard maturities, 3) free entry of foreign institutions to 
domestic financial markets, 4) freedom from capital restrictions, and 
5) much flexible exchange rates. At the same time, organizing strong 
and sound macro-prudential regulations and effective and competent 
financial supervisory institutions are required. However, capital 
account liberalization is likely to result in boom–bust cycles. During 
the transition period, China must be cautious of volatile capital flows. 
Large fluctuations in the capital flows also generate financial market 
instability in the region. Many Asian countries are vulnerable to China-
originated shocks. Thus, RMB internationalization must be gradual, 
persistent, and orderly. Otherwise, it will bring about damage in and 
out of China.
14 On July 21, 2005, the PRC authorities announced that they would revalue 
the RMB against the U.S. dollar and move away from the long-standing U.S. 
dollar peg system to a managed floating system. In the summer of 2008, the PRC 
authorities decelerated the pace of RMB appreciation and restored a U.S. dollar 
peg system for the RMB. In June 2010, they abandoned the peg once again, 
resuming RMB appreciation against the U.S. dollar. See Kawai, and Pontines 
(2014) for more details.
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The initiative of “One Belt and One Road (OBOR)” advocated by 
President Xi Jinping in 2014 is a new model of open regionalism, which 
not only is conducive to China’s western development but also helps 
to build a new infrastructure for neighboring countries. The initiative 
aims to provide public goods through enhanced connectivity—trade, 
investment, finance, people, and culture. Many developing countries in 
Asia continue to suffer from serious shortage of infrastructure, which 
hinders their economic development and their connectivity to other 
trading partners. China showed leadership by playing a large role and 
sustaining much responsibility on global economic governance. The 
China-initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) will play 
a vital role in infrastructure financing. However, the role of the RMB 
remains limited because the AIIB financing will mostly be carried out 
in the U.S. dollar. The U.S. has not yet joined the AIIB as a signatory 
member. However, the lending facilities of AIIB and its leveraged capital 
will be likely denominated in dollars because dollar financing is cost 
saving. 
The OBOR initiative can be combined with RMB internationalization, 
particularly in the area of settlement and financing. The RMB can 
be used for long-term project financing currency if China’s state-
owned banks jointly co-finance the project. At the same time, Chinese 
overseas investment will boost the economic development along with 
infrastructure building. Such overseas investment carried out by 
Chinese corporations will provide support for RMB internationalization. 
The OBOR region will settle the transactions of trade and international 
direct investment using the RMB. To do so, more RMB offshore clearing 
banks should be established in the OBOR region for the settlement 
and financing. Moreover, European countries joined the AIIB as 
founding members, demonstrating strong business interests in various 
infrastructure projects. RMB clearing banks already established 
in Europe will enhance the recycling of the RMB through various 
channels. Thus, the RMB-denominated bank lending to the OBOR 
region or the RMB-denominated international debts issued by the 
OBOR countries for infrastructure financing will definitely facilitate 
RMB internationalization. Despite the many remaining controls in 
capital account, China can pursue RMB internationalization in an 
unconventional manner.
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VI. Implications for Asian Monetary Cooperation
As the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 amply demonstrated, 
countries in the region were closely interrelated and simultaneously 
vulnerable to contagion from one another. As Calvo et al. (1996) noted 
earlier in the 1990s, “global factors affecting foreign investment tend 
to have an important cyclical component, which has given rise to 
repeated booms and busts in capital inflows.” As the recent literature 
also confirmed, excessive credit growth is one of the best predictors of 
crisis.15 Many Asian countries became victims of such volatile capital 
flows. In reality, financial instability is unlikely to remain within the 
national borders of the country of origin. Cooperative efforts at both 
regional and global levels are required to counter negative spillovers. As 
long as the crisis remains country-specific, unaffected countries have 
no urgent political need to pay the significant costs associated with 
playing the role of a fire fighter. Nevertheless, neighbors help put out a 
fire before it spreads to them.
The formation of a regional financial arrangement in East Asia 
also reflects frustration with the slow reform of the international 
financial system (Park, and Wang 2002). As long as the structural 
problems on the supply side of international capital, such as volatile 
capital movements and exchange rate gyrations of major international 
currencies, persist, Asian countries will remain as vulnerable to future 
crises unless they keep accumulating huge amount of foreign exchange 
reserves. Thus, Asian countries should work together to create their 
own cooperative arrangements. Recognizing the need to establish 
regional financial arrangements for supplementing the existing 
international facilities, the finance ministers of ASEAN+3 at their 
meeting in Chiang Mai, Thailand in May 2000 agreed to strengthen the 
existing cooperative frameworks in the region through the Chiang Mai 
Initiative (CMI).
In 2010, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) replaced 
the CMI. CMIM introduced collective decision-making procedures 
for CMI swap activation and adopted a self-managed reserve pooling 
arrangement governed by a single contractual agreement. The total size 
of the CMIM doubled to 240 billion USD in May 2012. However, the 
15 See Gourinchas, and Obstfeld (2012) and Schularick, and Talyor (2012). 
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CMIM is basically a U.S. dollar liquidity support arrangement with the 
IMF linkage, thereby excluding the local currency swaps. The necessity 
and desirability of including local currency swaps must be discussed 
in the future when the RMB increasingly obtains the full convertibility 
status vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar.
An important challenge for ASEAN+3 authorities is to strengthen the 
effectiveness of regional economic surveillance supported by ASEAN+3 
Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) to reduce and ultimately 
eliminate the CMIM’s IMF linkage so that ASEAN+3 member countries 
can use the CMIM in both crisis and near-crisis situations without the 
IMF program. As long as the IMF linkage remains, the countries having 
only the dollar liquidity crisis will not willingly request activation of the 
CMIM mainly because of the incredibly punishing stigma effect. Kawai 
(2015) clearly pointed out that the key is to improve the quality of 
regional economic surveillance and create conditions to promote further 
IMF delinking. For this purpose, AMRO should become a credible 
international organization tasked with regional economic surveillance 
and liquidity support in times of financial and currency turmoil so 
that it can assess the economic and financial conditions of countries 
requesting assistance and formulate lending conditionality. A new 
version of Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), which was dismissed by the U.S. 
during the Asian financial crisis, is suggested.
RMB internationalization will be an arduous process that takes 
considerable efforts and time. During the transition to full convertibility 
and free floating, RMB internationalization will generate totally different 
shocks to many Asian countries. Although its expansion remains 
unknown, the international use of the RMB will definitely cause many 
Asian countries to be sensitive to the RMB stability. Many Asian banks 
and corporations will hold RMB-denominated assets and liabilities. 
Although China’s Bilateral Swap lines can be used, the CMIM excludes 
local currencies, such as the RMB. Therefore, RMB swap lines will be as 
important as the U.S. dollar.16
The answer to the questions regarding the desirability of Asian 
monetary cooperation is at best speculative. Any possibility to 
create a common currency area (monetary arrangement) is unlikely 
16 Ito (2016) emphasizes the role of local currency swaps as a regional 
arrangement to bail out a crisis country as RMB internationalization proceeds.
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in consideration of almost non-existent political will among Asian 
countries. Furthermore, scant evidence shows that exchange rate 
movements among East Asian countries exert a strong negative effect 
on intra-regional trade (Shin, and Wang 2007). Nevertheless, RMB 
internationalization may change the landscape of Asia’s industrial and 
economic structures and promote the trade and financial integration, 
thus generating macroeconomic and financial effect on many Asian 
countries. RMB internationalization should be on the agenda for the 
policy dialogue among ASEAN+3.
VII. Concluding Remarks
The scale and speed of China’s emergence as a major global actor, 
whose economy is set to overtake that of the U.S. by the end of the 
present decade, has been the most important international event since 
the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, China’s ascent has bred a set 
of misconceptions that obscure the reality of a country, and the basic 
building blocks of interpretation are often incomprehensible. Irwin 
(2013) noted in his book that Governor Zhou offered a fitting metaphor 
for the differences between Chinese and Western economic policy. He 
said, “a drug from Western medicine, which is based on the theory and 
clinical trials, usually contains one ingredient and has a quick effect, 
while a prescription of Chinese medicine includes various ingredients 
that work together to treat a disease.” He added, “some drugs with large 
side effects may be removed, or reduced through trial and error. This is 
learning through experience, with endless adjustments.”  
Zhou and PBOC were persistent and opportunistic in pushing for 
RMB internationalization. They consistently promoted the idea that 
China’s currency should one day stand alongside the dollar, euro, and 
yen as an important currency for global trade and finance. However, 
no clear announced roadmap exists. In public communications, Zhou 
and PBOC soft-pedal the idea that they are trying to make the RMB a 
major global currency. In official documents, the phrase used for the 
phenomenon is not “RMB internationalization,” but “the RMB going 
out,” which means going beyond China (Irwin 2013). China is supporting 
the use of the RMB in international transactions before fully liberalizing 
other aspects of its economic and financial policy. China’s approach 
toward RMB internationalization is certainly cautious and gradual, as 
Eichengreen (2015) describes the Chinese preference for “crossing the 
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river by feeling the stone’s beneath one’s feet.” Considerable progress 
and time will be required in reforming domestic financial markets and 
institutions before removing the residual restrictions on international 
financial transactions that limit the international use of the RMB.
The RMB will unlikely replace the role of the U.S. dollar because the 
euro could not challenge the status of dollar during the last decade 
or so. The power of strong network externalities of the dollar will not 
vanish anytime soon. Despite without a formal monetary arrangement 
such as the euro, the RMB may achieve a regional settlement currency 
within Asia, given the increasing volume of trade with China. In the long 
run, many Asian countries, including South Korea, will increasingly use 
RMB for both international trade and finance. The possibility of forming 
a RMB bloc should not be ignored.17 The expected candidates for RMB 
bloc may include Hong Kong, Taipei, and countries enjoying strong 
trade and investment linkages with China. Countries that belong to 
RMB bloc tend to attain co-movements of exchange rates with the RMB. 
China should subsequently exert strong leadership in the monetary and 
financial fronts to ensure a financially resilient RMB bloc. 
(Received 6 October 2016; Revised 8 November 2016; Accepted 8 
November 2016)
17 Recent empirical studies on the emergence of RMB bloc using the Frankel–
Wei (1994) model exist. See Henning (2012), Subramanian, and Kessler (2012), 
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